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Chapter 4 How Does the Coopetition Network Affect Coopetition Governance?10 
 
Abstract: Whereas prior research has focused on the performance implications of coopetition, 
we shift our attention to the governance of coopetitive relationships. Following recent insights 
obtained from the broader research stream on alliance governance, we explore the impact of the 
firms’ network position on the governance choice in specific coopetitive dyads. We empirically 
test our hypothesis in the global solar photovoltaic industry between 1995 and 2015. The results 
show that the increased relative centrality and structural autonomy between coopetitors 
increase the possibility of using equity structures in coopetitive relationships. By documenting 
the importance of firms’ coopetition network positions in coopetitive governance design, this 
study provides new insights into how firms can manage the substantial value appropriation 





                                                 
10 The manuscript is co-authored by Dries Faems and John Dong. 




Coopetition simultaneously involves competition and cooperation (Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff, 2011; Gnyawali et al., 2006; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Kraus et al., 2017; Tsai, 
2002). Coopetition provides firms with learning opportunities and access to diverse resources 
residing in competing firms, but it also involves high appropriation risks (Park et al., 2014a). 
There are substantial appropriation risks in collaboration with competitors in comparison with 
other collaboration modes, such as collaboration with customers, suppliers, and universities 
(Estrada et al., 2016). 
In the broader alliance literature (e.g., Faems et al., 2008; Ryu et al., 2017), the initial 
governance structure has been mentioned as an important design factor that can substantially 
shape the value appropriation implications of collaborative endeavors. At one end are joint 
ventures which involve partners sharing equity in a new entity. At the other end are contractual 
alliances without equity (De Resende et al., 2018). Despite wide recognition that the initial 
governance structure is an important choice in mitigating appropriation concerns in 
collaborative settings, the coopetition literature has paid limited attention to such governance 
choices in coopetitive relationships. Instead, the coopetition research (e.g. Ritala, 2012) has 
mainly focused on the performance implications of coopetition, largely ignoring how these 
relationships are initially designed.  
The core objective of this paper is therefore to explore the initial governance structure of 
coopetitive relationships. Following recent insights in the broader alliance literature (Ozmel et 
al., 2017; Ryu et al., 2017), we apply a social network perspective to address this objective. We 
focus on two networks characteristics — i.e., centrality and structural autonomy — and 
examine their impact on the governance structure of coopetitive relationships. These two 
characteristics correspond to different types of resource benefits from networks: centrality is 
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related to status whereas structural autonomy is related to information diversity (Koka and 
Prescott, 2002).  
To test our hypotheses, we collected a dataset of 381 dyad coopetitors in the global solar 
photovoltaic (PV) industry between 1995 and 2015. Merging data from multiple archival 
sources (i.e., LexisNexis, SDC, Orbis, Compustat and PATSTAT databases), we built 
coopetition networks and coded the governance structure for each coopetition dyad. We define 
relative centrality/structural autonomy as relative differences between coopetitors concerning 
coopetition network centrality/structural autonomy. Our analyses show a positive relationship 
between the relative centrality in coopetition networks and the equity structure in coopetitive 
relationships. We also find that the relative structural autonomy in the coopetition network 
increases the possibility of equity structure in coopetitive dyads. Our study contributes to 
coopetition studies, showing that coopetition governance is affected by the resource symmetry 
of coopetitors in terms of centrality and structural autonomy in their coopetition network. From 
a practical perspective, our findings provide specific recommendations on how firms govern 
their coopetition to minimize value appropriation concerns in coopetitive relationships. 
This paper is organized in four parts. First, we review the extant research, illuminating the 
need to study how social network characteristics influence governance structure decisions in 
coopetitive relationships. Subsequently, we propose hypotheses on how relative centrality and 
structural autonomy impact the possibility of adopting an equity governance structure. We then 
describe our methodological approach and discuss our results. Finally, we discuss the 
theoretical and managerial contributions, limitations and future research opportunities. 
4.2. Governance from a Social Network Perspective 
The strategy literature has long argued that alliance governance is critical for their success and 
stability (Das and Teng, 1996; Faems et al., 2008; Gulati, 1995; Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009). 
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A core governance decision in alliance settings is the choice between equity or non-equity 
governance structures. An equity governance structure refers to a structural arrangement where 
partners bring resources to a separate legal entity and are rewarded for their contribution from 
the benefits earned by this entity, or when a partner acquires partial ownership of another 
partner (Hennart, 1988). In contrast, a non-equity structure refers to a wide list of contractual 
agreements, such as supply, market distribution, and R&D contracts, where collaborating 
partners do not engage in the exchange of equity. 
Scholars have suggested that introducing an equity governance structure is especially 
relevant in the case of high perceived opportunistic behavior. An equity governance structure 
can help to mitigate opportunism concerns in different ways. First, sharing the equity of a joint 
venture is considered a ‘mutual hostage’ since it aligns the interests of all partners (Gulati, 
1995). Sharing the common values of the alliance may offer an incentive alignment mechanism 
to foster mutual forbearance and diminish opportunism. Despite having the opportunity to 
extract private value, partners may refrain from opportunistic actions fearing the associated 
reduction in their common values (Arslan, 2017). For example, Yang et al. (2015) found that 
equity governance helps firms to suppress the competitive learning race between partners. 
Second, transaction cost theorists claim that equity helps firms to establish long-term 
collaboration and forgo short-term competitive actions. In an equity alliance, the alliance 
partners not only need to make ex-ante commitments, but they also need to reduce their 
incentives for opportunistic behavior considering their own existing and future investments 
(Goerzen, 2007). Third, once firms decide to establish an alliance, some concerns will arise 
from anticipated coordination costs because of pervasive behavioral uncertainty. Sharing equity 
can foster specialized coordination by including considerable hierarchical controls (Gulati and 
Singh, 1998). For example, equity structures are usually accompanied by an independent 
administrative department, which provides clearly defined regulations and responsibilities for 
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all partners in an ongoing coordination. As part of establishing a joint venture entity, partners 
usually put in place normative operation systems and dispute settlement procedures. 
The alliance governance literature has traditionally considered a number of different 
characteristics of the focal collaborative transaction that shapes the partners’ governance 
structure choice, including trust and relational dynamics (Gulati, 1995; Reuer and Ariño, 2007), 
partner and task uncertainty (Santoro and McGill, 2005), the types of assets involved (Hoetker 
and Mellewigt, 2009), and joint R&D intensity (Osborn and Baughn, 1990). More recently, 
several scholars have begun highlighting the relevance of the partnering firms’ social network 
position in understanding this strategic choice. Their core argument is that social network 
characteristics may affect a firm’s perception of the opportunistic behaviors of partners, thereby 
influencing the governance structure of alliances (Ozmel et al., 2017; Ryu et al., 2017). 
Network characteristics may affect the availability of network resources by signaling a firm’s 
status (Bonacich, 2007), by certifying the trust to partners (Gulati, 1995), or by helping the 
focal firm access diverse knowledge (Burt, 2004). Differences between collaborating partners 
in network resources can lead to asymmetries, which can shape the partners’ perceptions of the 
risk of opportunistic behavior within a particular relationship (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001). 
In this case, firms should govern alliances to mitigate opportunism concerns, which originate 
from network positions. Ozmel et al. (2017), for instance, examined how a firm’s alliance 
network centrality influences its value capture rights in high-tech alliance contracts. Ryu et al. 
(2017) suggested that equity alliance design can defend unintentional knowledge spillovers 
through indirect ties with rivals. 
In this paper, we rely on and complement these recent alliance governance insights by 
exploring the governance structure of coopetitive relationships. Prior coopetition research has 
emphasized the performance implications of such relationships. While some recent conceptual 
or qualitative coopetition literature begins to focus on how coopetition relationships are 
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managed, coordinated, and governed, there is a lack of empirical evidence concerning the 
actual governance of such relationships. In this paper, we contribute to addressing this gap by 
identifying two social network characteristics that can influence the governance structure in 
coopetitive relationships. In the next section, we explain in-depth how these structural network 
characteristics influence the governance structure in coopetitive relationships.  
4.3. Hypotheses 
Coopetition network structures can impact its resource asymmetries among coopetitors in a 
network (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Gnyawali et al., 2006). We restrict the scope of this 
study to centrality and structural autonomy. These two structural properties are theoretically 
interesting in the coopetition network context as they impact a firm’s power to access and 
obtain resources as well as to control the potential flow of information to rivals, thereby 
resulting in network-based resource asymmetries. In particular, network centrality 
demonstrates a high position in a status hierarchy (Ibarra, 1993). This implies that differences in 
centrality trigger high status asymmetry. Structural autonomy plays a critical role in the 
information diffusion and provides superior access to non-redundant information that is more 
additive than overlapping (Ahuja, 2000). Differences in structural autonomy therefore increase 
information asymmetry between two partners. Both of the asymmetries can increase the 
likelihood of opportunistic actions, influencing the governance mode choice. 
4.3.1. Relative Centrality and Coopetition Governance 
Centrality indicates to what degree firms occupy strategic positions in networks by virtue of 
being involved in many linkages (Gnyawali et al., 2006). Of the various kinds of centrality, 
eigenvector centrality is particularly relevant to network status (Bonacich, 2007). Studies 
define eigenvector centrality in terms of the status of a focal firm recursively related to the 
statuses of the firms the focal firm is connected to (Bonacich, 1987; Lin et al., 2009; Ruhnau, 
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2000). Specifically, eigenvector centrality attributes a value to each actor such that an actor 
receives a large value if it is strongly connected with many other nodes that are themselves 
central within the network (Mehra et al., 2006). Because more central firms have more and 
shorter paths to other firms, they can access and acquire more network resources. Centrality is 
therefore associated with social status (Cook, 1977; Yeniyurt and Carnovale, 2017). Higher 
relative centrality between coopetitors means that high-status firms collaborate with low-status 
firms, thereby resulting in high status asymmetry between them. 
We argue that, in case of high relative centrality, the associated status asymmetry between 
coopetitors is likely to trigger more opportunism concerns. A firm with high status is always a 
sought-after actor and attracts more competitors seeking to collaborate with it (Ahuja, 2000; 
Dong et al., 2017; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001). In this case, superior status would provide 
the firm with high availability of alternative partners, thus increasing the lower-status firm’s 
perceived opportunistic behaviors. In this case, the lower-status firm is likely to prefer an equity 
structure to prevent the opportunistic actions of the higher-status firm. At the same time, the 
low-status firms in the collaboration are perceived to be more openly parasitic (i.e., 
opportunistic, freeloading, exploitative) (Chung et al., 2000; Fiske et al., 2002). The coopetitor 
with lower status is likely to channel its efforts toward private benefit extraction rather than 
toward joint value creation. When the status asymmetry is high, the firm with high status may 
have low trust and confidence in its coopetitor with low status and might, therefore, prefer to 
use equity governance to monitor and control this coopetitor. In summary, high status 
asymmetry is likely to trigger more opportunism concerns, thereby making equity governance 
more attractive than non-equity governance. Accordingly, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the relative centrality between coopetitors, the greater the 
likelihood of equity-based coopetition designs. 
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4.3.2. Relative Structure Autonomy and Coopetition Governance 
A structurally autonomous firm spans structural holes between competitors that are otherwise 
disconnected. For example, if firm A allies with both competitors B and C, while B and C do 
not ally directly to each other, then A spans a structural hole existing between B and C. In 
other words, B and C can link with each other only through broker firm A. In coopetition 
networks, a structurally autonomous firm spans structural holes by linking competitors that 
were not otherwise linked together. Burt’s classic work showed that a firm bridging structural 
holes–the gaps between its partners otherwise disconnected in the network–is likely to 
perform better because of its superior access to heterogeneous information (Burt, 2004, 2009). 
A firm spanning structural holes in coopetition networks receives unique but diverse 
competition information from its ties with competitors (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001). A 
firm’s access to such information will depend upon whether it spans structural holes. This 
information differential between two coopetitors is termed as information asymmetry. 
The information asymmetry associated with relative structural autonomy creates clear 
incentives for opportunistic behavior (Afuah, 2013). On the one hand, network members that 
bridge more structural holes in a network may decide to use the power their position creates 
opportunistically for self-gain (e.g., tertius gaudens behaviors) rather than for the interest of 
the network (Sparrowe et al., 2001). The inferior firm has a strong reason to perceive that its 
inability to assess diverse information can also be opportunistically exploited by the superior 
firm. In a context of high information asymmetry, the alliance can be seen as a learning race 
(Hamel, 1991), and the superior firm is likely to have high potential to be the leader in this 
learning race. The inferior firm may therefore fear that, when the superior firm has finished 
learning from the inferior firm, the former is inclined to terminate the alliance (Inkpen and 
Beamish, 1997). The inferior firm might therefore prefer an equity ownership structure, as 
such a structure is more difficult to dissolve. 
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On the other hand, we argue that the superior firm is also likely to turn to equity 
arrangements to reduce its opportunism concerns. Researchers have recognized the 
bidirectional effects and mutual influence of partners’ opportunistic behaviors on the focal 
firm’s opportunistic behavior (Das and Rahman, 2010). Specifically, information asymmetry 
increases the inferior firm’s fear of the superior firms’ opportunism (Wathne and Heide, 2000), 
which, in turn, may increase the inferior firms’ own possibility of opportunistic behaviors 
(Das and Rahman, 2010). Considering this logic, the superior firm might realize that as it 
apprehends opportunisms of the inferior firms, the superior firm may, in turn, also take actions 
to prevent opportunistic behaviors in situations of information asymmetry. Furthermore, 
information diversity influences both the incentives and the ability of coopetitors to behave 
opportunistically and, therefore, the threat of leakage in a coopetition. When the superior firm 
has highly diverse information, the inferior firms’ incentives to behave opportunistically 
increase since the inferior firms have more to gain from such behavior (Sampson, 2004). 
Given these challenges that are associated with a strong structural position in terms of 
information asymmetry, the superior firm is likely to turn to the equity design. Hence, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the relative structural autonomy between coopetitors, the 
greater the likelihood of equity-based coopetition designs. 
4.4. Methodology 
4.4.1. Data 
To test our arguments, we rely on a dataset from the global solar photovoltaic (PV) industry 
from 1995 to 2015. The PV industry is a proper context for this study due to the strong rise in 
the use of coopetition strategies as key tools to implement the growth and innovation of firms 
(Kapoor and Furr, 2015), allowing us to track the PV firms’ coopetition activities. 
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We used the LexisNexis database and Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum database 
to identify collaborations among PV firms. Based on the LexisNexis database, we coded a total 
of 1,115 alliance agreements in the PV industry in the period from 1995–201511. We also 
searched the SDC dataset using the same PV related items and acquired 514 solar PV alliances 
in 1995-2015. Among these alliances, 419 alliances are present in the LexisNexis database and 
95 alliances are not. Following this procedure, we finally obtained 1,210 unique solar PV 
alliances. 
Our competition data are taken primarily from Orbis, a rich firm-level dataset that also 
provides information on the major sectors of the companies according to their main business. 
For example, the Orbis database divides all firms into 20 major sectors (e.g., machinery, 
agriculture, banks, chemicals, electricity). We consider that if two firms belong to the same 
major sector, they are competitors. Further, if they are in an alliance with each other, they are 
coopetitors. Out of the 1210 alliances, we obtained 381 dyad-year level coopetition 
observations. In our sample, the average duration of all coopetition agreements with exact 
termination information is 4.30 years, providing support for the assumption of the 5-year 
duration of a coopetition. Since the exact time of relation-termination sometimes cannot be 
acquired, we took a conservative approach and assumed that alliance relationships would 
sustain for five years, consistent with prior empirical work on the alliance durations (Gulati and 
Gargiulo, 1999; Jiang et al., 2018).  
To construct our control variables, we drew from the European Patent Office’s (EPO) 
PATSTAT database for patent data. The EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database has been 
developed by the European Patent Office cooperating with the OECD (Grimpe and Hussinger, 
2014). The PATSTAT database has a worldwide coverage, containing data from 84 patent 
offices, covering all inventor countries and spanning a time period stretching back to 1880 for 
                                                 
11 Please refer to chapter 2 for a more extensive discussion. 
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some countries and offices (Wagner et al., 2014). It is considered to be one of the most 
comprehensive patent databases currently available. Each patent can be classified into one or 
more technology classes, indicating the specific technological area of the patent. At this step, 
we found 36,459 patents filed by our sampled firms in the PATSTAT database.  
Furthermore, we collected financial data from the Compustat database, which is 
frequently used for both research and decision making. However, the Compustat database 
covers only the public firms in an industry. ORBIS is a comprehensive database with 
accounting and financial information from both public and private firms across the region that 




The dependent variable, coopetition governance, was coded “1” if a coopetition involved 
the use of equity and “0” if it did not (Phene and Tallman, 2012; Ryu et al., 2017). 
Specifically, equity-based coopetition includes joint ventures and equity investment, while the 
other includes other coopetition forms, such as licensing agreements, technology agreements, 
marketing and distribution agreements, manufacturing agreements, and R&D agreements. The 
fundamental feature that distinguishes equity coopetition from non-equity coopetition is that 
equity sharing relates to shared ownership and is effective in reducing exposure to 
opportunistic behavior.  
To test our arguments about the impact of the relative network position on coopetition 
governance, we utilized two measures widely used in the prior network research: (i) 
eigenvector centrality and (ii) structural autonomy. These two network measures correspond 
to different types of resources benefits from networks: centrality is related to status whereas 




To assess a firm’s centrality in the coopetition network among firms, we measured the 
centrality of the firm within this inter-firm network by calculating the (normalized) 
eigenvector routine in UCINET 6, which calculated centrality as the summed linkages to 
other firms weighted by their centrality (Bonacich, 1972). The higher the eigenvector 
centrality value of an actor, the more the network actor is connected to actors who have been 
already linked with many others. Because both direct and indirect ties are taken into 
consideration, the eigenvector value is an appropriate measurement of the availability of 
information and the potential for influence because “direct and indirect ties provide access 
both to people who can themselves provide support and to the resources those people can 
mobilize through their own network ties” (Adler and Kwon, 2002). To make this eigenvector 
value comparable across networks, we followed the standard empirical practice of 
normalizing this value (Sparrowe et al., 2001). Specifically, we used the following formula to 









  , 
where  c ,   refers to a vector of centrality values for firms,   is an arbitrary scaling 
factor,   indicates a weight, and 1 means a column vector of ones. The magnitude and sign 
of this variable demonstrates the weight given to the centrality of others connected to the focal 
firm in calculating the centrality of the focal firm. Because 0  , the focal firm who 
connects to highly central firms is also highly central (Bonacich, 1987). Finally, since we 
calculated the relative centrality in the coopetition network, we use the absolute difference of 
eigenvector centrality between two focal firms as the index of relative centrality. 
Relative structure autonomy 
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We calculate relative structural autonomy in three steps. First, we measure the lack of 
spanning structural holes by using Burt’s network constraint measure (Burt, 2009), as follows: 
 
2
k ij ik kjConstraint p p p , k i, j    
In the above equation, ijp  indicates the strength of the tie between firms i and j, while 
ik kjp p  is the sum of the indirect coopetition tie strength in the connection of i and j, all 
through firm k. In the second step, we follow Wang et al. (2014) to measure structural hole 
access as two minus the constraint value of the firm (where the constraint value was non-zero), 
transforming this variable from a measure of lack of spanning to one of spanning (Zaheer and 
Bell, 2005).  
2k kStructure Holes Constraint  , 
A high aggregate constraint value indicates a situation where one has built a redundant 
coopetition network in which its coopetitors are linked with each other. Thus, our measure of 
structural hole spanning (two minus the constraint measure) will indicate low network 
redundancy as follows: a high hole spanning score represents less redundancy; conversely, a 
low hole spanning score indicates higher redundancy in a firm’s coopetition networks. In the 
third step, since we calculated the relative structural autonomy in the coopetition network, we 
use the absolute difference of structural autonomy between two focal firms as the index of 
relative structure autonomy. 
1 2 1 2k k k k
Relative Structure Holes Structure Holes Structure Holes  , 
Control variables 
We included a number of variables that may influence the coopetition governance. The 
likelihood of an equity governance decision in an alliance may be affected by the firms’ 
technical knowledge (Bosse and Alvarez, 2010). For example, firms with more technical 
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knowledge prefer the equity design because of their high concerns about knowledge leakages. 
Consistent with this literature, we calculated relative technical knowledge stock by using the 
absolute difference between the total numbers of inventions of two focal firms in the year t - 5 
to t - 1, which measures the firm-level average intensity of cumulative patenting activities. 
Following Bosse and Alvarez (2010), we controlled for the relative firm age as the absolute 
age difference between the two focal firms. Because the internal structure is important in 
preventing uncertain risks (Osborn and Baughn, 1990), we controlled for the relative 
collaboration density by calculating the absolute difference between the ratio of actual 
co-inventing ties among internal knowledge workers within a firm to the total number of 
co-inventing ties in that firm, which indicates the connectivity of intrafirm collaboration ties. 
The firm efficiency measures each firm’s ability to convert resources into sales performance. 
We followed prior studies and used stochastic frontier analysis to calculate each firm’s 
efficiency using the four following indicators: fixed assets, number of employees, number of 
inventors and year dummies (Dutta et al., 2005; Zheng et al., 2015). We calculated the 
efficiency for each firm as the ratio of its efficiency to the efficient frontier, which captures 
the most efficient firm in our sample (i.e., efficiency equals 1). Employees and R&D 
expenditure should be controlled because they reflect the absolute availability of resources 
(Zheng et al., 2015). The relative employees variable is the absolute difference between the 
average numbers of employees in the focal period. Relative R&D is the absolute difference 
between the average annual R&D expenditure of two focal firms. We also controlled for the 
effect of current coopetitors on the governance negotiation outcome. The relative direct 
coopetitors variable is the absolute difference between the number of coopetitive relationships 
of two focal firms. Diversity along the skill and competence-based dimensions of a firm is a 
relevant predictor of its actions and outcomes (Golden and Zajac, 2001). Technology breadth 
and market breadth have been found to potentially affect value appropriation (Diestre and 
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Rajagopalan, 2012). We use the following formula to measure technology breadth: 
   i j i jT T T T   , where iT  is defined as the profile of the technological classes of firm i 
in the year t-5 to t-1. Thus, the technology breadth measures the number of technological 
areas that two focal firms operate outside their common areas. Similarly, We use the 
following formula to measure market breadth:    i j i jM M M M   , where iM  is 
defined as the profile of product categories of firm i in the year t-5 to t-1. The product 
categories are indicated by SIC Codes. Thus, market breadth measures the number of 
production areas that two focal firms operate outside their common areas. Patent stock, Firm 
age, Employees and R&D were log-transformed to remove skewness for all the analyses. All 
the variables are measured at the firm dyad level. 
4.4.3. Analysis strategy 
A logit model was conducted to assess the impacts of the independent variables on the 

















where  1iP M   means the probability that coopetition i is equity based and iX  represents 
the vector of independent variables. The beta coefficients in this model represent the change in 
the logarithmic odds of the dependent variable when there is one unit change in the independent 
variable. A variable’s positive coefficient indicates its propensity to promote equity coopetition. 
On the other hand, a variable’s negative beta coefficient indicates its propensity to promote 
non-equity-based coopetition. 
4.5. Results 
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations among all the variables. The 
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descriptive statistics present pre-standardized means and standard deviations, though all 
variables are standardized for the subsequent regression analyses. The mean VIF for a linear 
model is 1.42 with a maximum of 2.08; these numbers are well below the suggested thresholds 







Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Equity 0.344 0.475 1           
2 Knowledge stock 85.628 241.367 0.004 1          
3 Firm age 33.683 35.598 0.010 -0.077 1         
4 Collaboration density 0.239 0.374 -0.095 0.496*** 0.006 1        
5 Firm efficiency 0.293 0.376 0.060 0.388*** -0.093 0.265*** 1       
6 Employees 52.230 109.401 -0.009 0.099 -0.047 0.157** 0.228*** 1      
7 R&D 721.327 1385.430 -0.055 -0.028 0.174** 0.126** 0.229*** 0.448*** 1     
8 Direct coopetitors 0.429 0.896 0.031 0.227*** -0.088 0.049 0.056 0.044 -0.093 1    
9 Technology breadth 18.403 45.735 0.027 0.589*** -0.104 0.289*** 0.242*** 0.121** 0.099* 0.201*** 1   
10 Market breadth 2.459 2.481 0.009 0.001 -0.039 0.047 0.062 0.177*** 0.355*** -0.083 0.263*** 1  
11 Centrality .003 0.013 0.182*** -0.057 -0.076 -0.072 0.045 0.019 -0.061 0.374*** -0.040 0.145** 1 
12 Structural autonomy 0.133 0.238 0.135** 0.139** -0.029 0.051 0.005 -0.057 -0.043 0.565*** 0.123* -0.032 0.161** 









Table 4.2 reports the results of the Logit regression. All variables are standardized before 
their entry into regression. Model 1 in Table 4.2 is a baseline specification including only the 
control variables, and Models 2 and 3 introduces two core independent variables to test our two 
hypotheses. Model 4 is the full model. Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive relationship between 
relative centrality and equity coopetition design. Model 2 in Table 4.2 shows that relative 
centrality takes a positive sign and is statistically significant, supporting H1 ( = 0.709, p < 
0.05). Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive effect of relative structure autonomy on equity 
coopetition design. Consistent with our expectation, the coefficient of relative structure 
autonomy in Model 3 is positive and statistically significant ( = 0.445, p < 0.05), supporting 
H2. These findings persist in the fully specified Model 4. 
Table 4.2. Regression Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Knowledge stock 0.078 0.156 0.088 0.174 -0.147 0.246 
 (0.216) (0.219) (0.218) (0.222) (0.097) (0.233) 
Firm age 0.107 0.124 0.113 0.135 -0.020 0.155 
 (0.168) (0.171) (0.169) (0.174) (0.073) (0.174) 
Collaboration density -0.395* -0.381* -0.420* -0.412* -0.005 -0.383* 
 (0.196) (0.199) (0.198) (0.203) (0.078) (0.202) 
Firm efficiency 0.211 0.146 0.231 0.168 0.126+ 0.125 
 (0.194) (0.178) (0.197) (0.181) (0.075) (0.199) 
Employees 0.197 0.190 0.254+ 0.254+ 0.003 0.247+ 
 (0.148) (0.150) (0.153) (0.156) (0.067) (0.155) 
R&D -0.116 -0.066 -0.142 -0.091 -0.126+ -0.042 
 (0.163) (0.166) (0.168) (0.173) (0.071) (0.178) 
Direct coopetitors -0.060 -0.292 -0.366 -0.744** 0.400*** -0.850** 
 (0.160) (0.204) (0.222) (0.292) (0.093) (0.333) 
Technology breadth 0.122 0.167 0.136 0.201 -0.110+ 0.235 
 (0.148) (0.151) (0.150) (0.154) (0.069) (0.158) 
Market breadth 0.152 0.041 0.159 0.031 0.257*** -0.100 
 (0.162) (0.180) (0.164) (0.185) (0.074) (0.211) 
Centrality  0.709*  0.797*  1.133* 
  (0.350)  (0.357)  (0.573) 
Structural autonomy   0.445* 0.562** -0.150 0.610** 
   (0.198) (0.211) (0.087) (0.219) 
Geographic density     -0.218**  
     (0.072)  
Coopetition ties     0.204**  
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     (0.075)  
Constant -0.785*** -0.739*** -0.848*** -0.817*** -0.068 -0.829*** 
 (0.202) (0.212) (0.207) (0.219) (0.089) (0.208) 
Log likelihood -113.41 -108.11 -110.80 -104.29 0.24 (R2) -108.78 
Note: + p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.  
All the variables are measured by relative value at the dyad level. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
However, there is a possibility that the key independent variables relative centrality and 
structural autonomy might be endogenous. Some researchers have suggested that the network 
position that firms occupy is related to various environment-specific and firm-specific factors 
that may also affect their coopetition strategy (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Bouncken and 
Fredrich, 2016; Gnyawali et al., 2006). Because the coopetition network embeddedness might 
be affected by some unobservable elements that are not in the choices of control variables, 
centrality and structural autonomy might have strong correlation with the error term in the 
regression model. We test for exogeneity of the two independent variables: centrality and 
structural autonomy. Using the Stata command “estat endogenous”, we found that in our all 
regression models, the Wu-Hausman test statistics show that the p-values are greater than 0.10 
for structural autonomy, which indicates that our data reject structural autonomy as an 
endogenous variable (e.g., p = 0.34 in full model). As such, the variable structural autonomy is 
treated as an exogenous variable in the current analysis. However, the Wu-Hausman test 
statistics show that most of the p-values are smaller than 0.10 for structural centrality (e.g., p = 
0.06 in full model), which shows the endogeneity of centrality. To cope with that, we use the 
IV-2SLS regression method. The first step we performed is to find appropriate instruments. An 
appropriate instrument should not have a direct impact on the main dependent variable (i.e., the 
equity coopetition design). However, it should directly correlate with our endogenous variable 
(i.e., centrality). We use Geographic Density and Coopetition Ties as our instruments. 
Geographic Density is calculated as the total number of solar PV firms co-located in the same 
countries or regions where the two firms are. Coopetition Ties is calculated as the total number 
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of coopetition ties between all sample firms in each period. These two instruments were used 
because the number of surrounding firms and relationships are more likely to influence the 
network property of two focal firms, but they are less likely to influence the design of their dyad 
coopetition. From an empirical perspective, we first include the two instruments, Geographic 
Density and Coopetition Ties, as main regressors and then run the regression model on the 
equity dummy variable. Although this regression is required in the IV estimation, it can be seen 
as a pre-test and the analysis result suggests that Geographic Density and Coopetition Ties do 
not have direct statistically significant impacts on the equity coopetition design. Second, we 
performed the first-stage IV analysis, which indicate that both Geographic Density and 
Coopetition Ties have significant effects on centrality. The result of first-stage IV estimation is 
displayed in Model 5 in Table 4.2. Third, we also test for under-identification (i.e., the 
Anderson canonical correlations test) and weak instruments (i.e., the Cragg-Donald Wald F 
test). The Anderson canonical correlations test shows that p-values in the under-identification 
test are smaller than 0.01, and the Cragg-Donald Wald F value is 17.64, which suggest the 
sufficient relevance of the two instruments with centrality (Stock and Yogo, 2002). The result of 
the second-stage IV estimation is displayed in Model 6 in Table 4.2. Our result remains 
supported in the robustness check. 
4.6. Discussion and conclusions 
We investigate how the coopetition network affects coopetition governance, focusing on 
whether the relative coopetition network results in resource symmetry and raises the 
possibility of using the equity design in coopetition. Although the previous coopetition 
research highlighted the importance of the coopetition network, few studies systematically 
examine the impact of the coopetition network on coopetition governance. The results support 
our prediction that, within a coopetitive relationship, greater relative network centrality and 
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structural autonomy increase the likelihood that a coopetition is equity-based. 
The core contribution of this study is that we connect coopetition network research and 
coopetition dyad research. The threat of opportunism in coopetition has spurred many studies 
in management, strategy, and innovation. First, the majority of studies have focused on 
coopetition network research, especially the effect of the coopetition network structure on the 
organization’s behavior and performance, such as centrality, structural holes and size 
(Bouncken and Fredrich, 2016; Sanou et al., 2016). This line of research suggests that the 
different position of a firm in a coopetition network shapes its bargaining power, status, 
resources and information. Another line of research focuses on coopetition dyad research, 
especially regarding how a firm chooses a coopetitor to maximize their value creation and 
minimize their value appropriation (Gnyawali and Park, 2009; Padula and Dagnino, 2007; 
Wilhelm, 2011). 
However, these two lines of research are relatively independent from each other. Some 
scholars, however, have realized that formulating and governing the relationship of two firms 
has to consider the broader network, in which this relationship is embedded. For example, 
Polidoro et al. (2011) argued that network properties, such as centrality, can result in status 
asymmetry, thereby increasing the risks of relationship dissolution. Ahuja et al. (2009) 
suggested that the asymmetries of network centrality can affect the design of dyad joint 
ventures. In this study, we contribute to connecting the network-level and dyad-level research 
by including coopetition network structures as important antecedents of governance choices. 
This study introduces coopetition network centrality and structural autonomy as sources of 
asymmetries and opportunistic behaviors, showing how these asymmetries impact dyad-level 
equity governance designs.  
The findings also have practical implications for firms’ managers and policy makers. The 
findings confirm that the coopetition network of firms can influence their coopetition 
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governance decision. Managers should attend to, for instance, the structures of the coopetition 
network in which their firms are embedded. For example, when engaging in coopetition with 
more central firms in the coopetition network, a firm could adopt equity-based agreements to 
control and monitor these coopetitors. As coopetition continues to grow in importance, the 
ability to build the coopetition network and choose the right coopetition governance structure 
may be one of the critical skills for the managers of the future. For policy makers, the status 
and information asymmetries should be considered in effective policymaking in terms of the 
coopetition network. They might make policies to influence the coopetition network 
structures and help firms to encounter these asymmetries.  
This study, similar to others, has several limitations and points to several opportunities for 
future research. First, we have not explored other types of network embeddedness (e.g., density) 
of coopetition networks as antecedents of coopetition governance. Future research could 
examine if the role of other different network embeddedness in affecting coopetition 
governance differs. Second, this paper only focused on the ownership mode as a coopetition 
governance mode, but future research could study more dimensions of coopetition governance, 
such as designing the coopetition scope and task interdependence. Third, although our 
hypothesis concerning the equity structure of coopetition relied on an established and 
empirically validated argument that coopetition network characteristics result in status and 
information asymmetry, our data did not allow us to observe the status and information of firms 
involved in coopetition. The results support the theoretical arguments, yet a better and deeper 
understanding of the mechanisms that underlie the observed impacts of coopetition network 
structures is needed to further validate and test the causal inferences of our study. Last but not 
the least, one interesting open question of this study is the role of the country-level environment. 
For example, for choices of ownership modes, international business research has already 
indicated the importance to consider institutional variables. It is important for future research to 
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consider the geographical context in this area. 
